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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section
78A-4-103(h).
Issues Presented For Review
1.

Did the trial court err when it used Mr. McPherson's gross income to

determine his ability to pay alimony?
Standard of Review: "We will review the trial court's decisions regarding child
support and alimony under the abuse of discretion standard." Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT
App29l,1J9, 169P.3d754.
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in Mr. McPherson's Second
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.396-403).
2.

Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion when it refused to

retroactively modify Mr. McPherson's alimony and child support obligations pursuant to
Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4)?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision relating to retroactive amendment of
support obligations is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wilde v. Wilde,
2001 UT App 318,1(27, 35 P.3d 34.1.
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in Mr. McPherson's Motion to
Amend Temporary Orders. (R.92-96).
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Statement of the Case
This case is a divorce action between the parties. The action was filed on
September 2, 2009 and a trial was held on June 25 and 30, 2010. The trial court entered a
final order on September 28, 2010.
Statement of Facts
1.

On October 30, 2010, the commissioner recommended that Mr. McPherson

pay temporary child support in the amount of $1,965 per month and temporary alimony in
the amount of $2,425 per month. These figures were based on Mr. McPherson's income
of approximately $175,000 per year. This recommendation was signed by the trial court
on November 30, 2009. (R.76-78).
2.

On November 25, 2009, Mr. McPherson was terminated from his position

on which the temporary awards were based. (R.346).
3.

Mr. McPherson subsequently began working as a diesel mechanic grossing

$4,680 per month which equates to $56,160 per year. (R.347).
4.

On December 14, 2009, Mr. McPherson filed a Motion to Amend

Temporary Orders requesting that his support obligations be modified based on his
significantly reduced income. (R.92-96).
5.

This request was denied based on Mrs. McPherson's allegation that Mr

McPherson was voluntarily underemployed and Mr. McPherson was ordered to invade up
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to one-half of his 401(k) plan to continue meeting the existing support obligations.
(R.112).
6.

On June 25 and June 30, 2010, a bench trial was held in this matter before

the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck. (R.341).
7.

The trial court found that Mr. McPherson was not voluntarily

underemployed and did not intentionally get terminated from his higher paying position to
avoid his alimony and child support obligations. (R.352).
8.

Following trial, Mr. McPherson's child support obligation was set pursuant

to the statutory tables ($851 per month) and alimony was set at $900 per month based on
Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680. (R.363).
9.

The trial court further found that Mr. McPherson's monthly expenses were

$3,155 per month. (R.356).
10.

The trial court further found that there was no basis to retroactively modify

Mr. McPherson's support obligations and entered judgment against him in the amount of
$9,641 due to past due support obligations. (R.358).
11.

On July 7, 2010, Mr. McPherson filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law due to the trial court's failure to consider Mr. McPherson's
ability to pay the alimony award. (R.366-76).
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12.

On August 4, 2010, the trial court acknowledged a mathematical error and

reduced Mr. McPherson's alimony obligation to $800 per month based on his gross
monthly income of $4,680. (R.390-91).
13.

In the August 4, 2010 Ruling, the trial arbitrarily reduced Mr. McPherson's

reasonable monthly expenses to $2,955 per month in order to make its math work
regarding the alimony obligation. (R.390-91).
14.

Using Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680 per month and

subtracting his child support of $851 and monthly expenses of $2,955, the trial court
found that Mr. McPherson had the ability to pay alimony in the amount of $800. (R.391).
15.

On August 10, 2010, Mr. McPherson filed a Second Motion to Amend

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the reason that the trial court calculated Mr.
McPherson's ability to pay alimony on his gross income, rather than his net income as
required by law. (R.396-98).
16.

On September 27, 2010, the trial court denied the second motion to amend

without explanation. (R.438).
Summary of Arguments
Utah law requires a trial court to consider an obligor's net income when
determining whether they have the ability to pay alimony. In this case, the trial court
based its alimony award on Mr. McPherson's gross income which left him unable to meet
his own monthly expenses as found by the trial court.
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Utah Code section 78B-12-112 provides that a child or spousal support order may
be modified retroactively to the month following service of a motion to modify. In this
case, the trial court refused to retroactively modify Mr. McPherson5s support obligation
even though it found that he was not voluntarily underemployed or attempting to avoid
his support obligations. The result is that the trial court entered a $9,641 judgment
against Mr. McPherson for past due support obligations that were based on income that
does not exist, which is an abuse of discretion.
Argument
I.

The Trial Court Committed an Abuse of Discretion When it Based Mr.
Mcpherson's Alimony Obligations on His Gross Monthly Income.

The alimony award entered in this case was based on a "clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion" and must be vacated. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (citation omitted). In its August 4, 2010 Ruling and Order, the trial court
erroneously used Mr. McPherson5s gross income to determine his ability to pay alimony.
The rule is that a trial court must consider after tax, net income when calculating whether
an obligor has the ability to pay alimony. See Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^J18,
169 P.3d 754 (reversing trial court that did not enter adequate findings to show proper
consideration of obligor's net income).
In its initial Ruling and Order, the trial court determined that Mr. McPherson
should pay $900 per month in alimony but entered no findings as to how Mr. McPherson
could pay such an award. See Memorandum Decision, R. 341-365, a copy of which is
5

attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 1 and incorporated herein by this reference. When this
omission was brought to the trial court's attention, it replied "Respondent is certainly
correct. The court did not specifically find that respondent could pay $900 per month
given his expenses though that was clearly inherent in the court's findings and
discussion." Ruling and Order, R.389-393, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum Ex. 2 and incorporated herein by this reference.
The trial court then proceeded to enter specific figures in an attempt to justify the
amount of alimony it awarded Mrs. McPherson. First, the trial court arbitrarily reduced
Mr. McPherson's reasonably monthly expenses to $2,955. See Addendum Ex. 2 (R.391).
The trial court offered no rationale as to why it amended its prior finding and it is
apparent that the only reason for the arbitrary change is to try and get the math to work.
The lack of foundation for this conclusion alone should cause it to be vacated1. The trial
court then took Mr. McPherson's gross monthly income of $4,680, subtracted his child
support obligation of $851 and his newly found monthly expenses of $2,955 and
determined that left him with more than $800 with which to pay alimony. See Addendum
Ex. 2 (R.391).

*The trial court must "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT
App 41, U 10, 974 P.2d 306 (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
6

The problem is that the trial court's calculation only works if Mr. McPherson
actually nets $4,680 per month, which he does not. After taxes, Mr. McPherson's net
income is approximately $3,270 per month. See Respondent's Trial Exhibit 101. After
subtracting Mr. McPherson's child support obligation of $851 per month and his
reasonable monthly expenses of $2,955, Mr. McPherson is in the negative $536 per
month.
In fashioning an alimony award, the trial court was required to address whether
Mr. McPherson will be left with sufficient funds to pay for his reasonable living
expenses. See Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), n.l (" the payor
spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to
provide support") (citation omitted). It is apparent from the trial court's findings that Mr.
McPherson cannot meet his own monthly expenses, let alone pay an additional amount as
alimony to Mrs. McPherson.
The trial court's alimony award leaves Mr. McPherson with approximately $1,500
per month after child support. This is insufficient to cover rent ($1,300) and food ($400)
as found by the trial court. The trial court's findings regarding alimony "must show that
the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence."
Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, f 18 (citing Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)). The trial court's findings do not logically follow the evidence and the
alimony award should be eliminated as Mr. McPherson has no ability to pay.
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II.

The Trial Court Committed an Abuse of Discretion by Refusing to
Retroactively Modify Mr. McPherson's Support Obligations.

Utah Code section 78B-12-112 provides that a child or spousal support order may
be modified retroactively to the month following service of a motion to modify. Mrs.
McPherson was served with Mr. McPherson's motion to modify on December 14, 2009
and therefore, the support obligations should have been amended retroactively to January
1,2010. (R.92-94).
The trial court based its refusal to retroactively modify the support obligations on
the commissioner's judgment call that Mr. McPherson's termination "appeared to be
'self-inflicted' and 'purposeful.'" See Addendum Ex. 1 (R.358). Once evidence was
heard however, the trial court found that the commissioner's determination was incorrect.
Because of this, there is no basis on which to sustain the commissioner's temporary award
and the support obligations should have been modified retroactively.
The trial court's refusal to do so resulted in a $4,390 per month support obligation
on an obligor who only grosses $4,680. Moreover, the temporary support award was
based on a set of facts and assumptions that have been proven to be wrong. This is
simply impermissible. As set forth above, alimony must be based on an obligor's ability
to pay which did not exist. Moreover, child support is required to be calculated pursuant
to actual income, not an incorrect assumption of income. See Utah Code Ann.
§78B-12-205.
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Not only did the trial court refuse to retroactively amend the support obligations, it
penalized Mr. McPherson further by entering judgment in the amount of $9,641 for
unpaid arrears. (R.358). Between January 1, 2010 and the date of trial, Mr. McPherson
paid $16,699 to Mrs. McPherson in temporary support. This amount is far in excess of
the $9,906 that he should have paid even if the conclusions and calculations of the trial
court were accepted as correct.2
In addition to the prejudice suffered by Mr. McPherson due to the grossly inflated
support obligation, he was further prejudiced by only receiving one quarter of his
retirement account. Mr. McPherson was ordered to invade up to one-half of his 401(k) to
meet the temporary support obligations. (R.213). Mr. McPherson did so and this amount
was paid to Mrs. McPherson. At trial, the court then awarded Mr. McPherson one-half of
what was left in his 401(k) which was approximately twenty five percent of the amount
he should have received.
As a result of the trial court's abuse of discretion, Mrs. McPherson has been
garnishing 50% of Mr. McPherson's income which has left him financially destitute. The
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public
charge. This policy should run both ways and the courts should be cognizant not to cause
the obligor to become a public charge, which is on the verge of happening in this matter.

2

These calculations were based on the $4,390 temporary support obligation versus the
$1,651 permanent support obligation entered by the trial court, from January 1, 2010 through
trial.
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In sum, the trial court's refusal to retroactively amend Mr. McPherson's support
obligations constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion. Again, the trial court's judgment
is not supported by, nor does it follow logically, from the evidence. Once the trial court
determined that the assumptions on which the temporary support was based were
incorrect, it should have vacated the temporary award. Mr. McPherson should have
received a credit/judgment for all alimony and any excess child support that he made from
service of the motion to modify until trial.
Conclusion
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by failing to consider Mr.
McPhersons's net income when determining his ability to pay alimony. Because Mr.
McPherson has no ability to pay alimony based on the findings of the trial court, the
award should be eliminated in its entirety. Further, the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion by refusing to retroactively modify the temporary support obligations that were
based on incorrect assumptions. Because Mr. McPherson does not have the ability to pay
any alimony award, he should receive a judgment against Mrs. McPherson for all alimony
paid since January 1, 2010, along with any child support overpayments made between
January 1, 2010 and entry of the trial court's final order.
DATED this _ [ | l day of May, 2011.
COHNK RAPPAPtjMp & SEGAL, P.C.

X^

V'

)shua K. Peterman
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 0fcffj*lt#£j£ ,.
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
%
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

°e.h

CINDI R. MCPHERSON
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,
Case No. 094401941
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
GORDON W . MCPHERSON,
Respondent.
DATE: July 1, 2010
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
June 25 and 30, 2010. Petitioner was present with James H.
Woodall and Respondent was present with Joshua K. Peterman.

On the first day of trial the court heard only one witness
and the case was postponed until June 30 at the request of
petitioner.

The eldest child of the parties had given birth

prematurely the night before on June 24 and based thereon the
court continued the trial a few days except for one witness who
would not be available on June 30, 2010 and thus testified on
June 25, 2010.

BACKGROUND
A complaint for divorce was filed September 25, 2009.
alleged the parties were married March 2, 1991.

It

Two children

were born of the marriage, Skye D. McPherson born October 12,
1992 (age 17), and Zackary W. McPherson born April 14, 1994 (age

16 at trial). Petitioner sought legal and physical custody, child
support, and a division of property as well as alimony.
Petitioner also sought temporary orders.
Respondent on October 22, 2009, filed an answer and
counterclaim. He sought joint legal and physical custody and
submitted a parenting plan.

He filed a counter motion for

temporary orders.
Petitioner also filed a parenting plan on October 26, 2010.
The commissioner held a hearing on October 30, 2010, and
recommended that petitioner be awarded the use of the marital
residence, sole legal and physical custody of the children with
liberal parent time for respondent. The parties were to respect
the desires of the children. Respondent was to pay $1965 child
support, $2425 in alimony and medical expenses were to be shared
equally under the statute.

Mediation was also ordered. The order

was signed December 1, 2009.
On December 10, 2009, petitioner moved for further orders.
Respondent then sought to amend the temporary orders.
A further hearing was held by the commissioner on January
11, 2010.

A recommendation was issued which required respondent

to maintain the mortgage payment and respondent was allowed to
access the 401(k) fund up to one half to maintain the obligations
ordered.

Issues certified for trial were the remaining 401(k)

fund, a change to alimony and child support and the sale of the
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marital residence.

The original amounts of alimony and child

support were to continue.

An order was prepared, and there were

objections by respondent. The order was signed March 12, 2010. An
emergency hearing was held before the court on February 5, 2010,
and the court ruled that the 401(k) fund be used for child
support and another hearing was to be held before the
commissioner. It was held February 26, 2010, and the original
amounts of alimony and child support were reconfirmed. The order
was signed April 29, 2010.
On March 17, 2010. Respondent filed another motion to amend
the temporary orders.
Another hearing was conducted by the commissioner on March
18, 2010 on petitioner's previously filed motion to bifurcate. It
was granted and all other issues were reserved.

That order was

signed May 4, 2010. The bifurcated decree was entered May 6,
2010.
A hearing was held again by the commissioner on April 21,
2010, on various motions of the parties.

The commissioner

recommended that an immediate trial occur, discovery could be reopened, the previous admissions were withdrawn, respondent was
allowed beginning in May 2010 to pay the mortgage directly in
lieu of alimony, the parties were required to attend at least one
mediation session concerning the home sale, mortgage arrears were
certified as was the issue of bringing current the mortgage
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payments. The order was signed May 13, 2010.
The pretrial order was signed May 18, 2010, certifying for
trial the issues of alimony, child support, respondent's request
for retroactive amendment since his employment change, allocation
of 2009 and 2010 tax liabilities, the disposition of the marital
home, division of retirement and respondent's claim that his
support payments should be charged against petitioner's share of
the retirement, whether respondent has become voluntarily
underemployed, division of personal property and bank accounts,
petitioner's claim of waste, respondent's claim of petitioner's
failure to maintain the mortgage, and attorney fees.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under
advisement.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds the background facts as above in the

BACKGROUND section.
2. The parties were married March 2, 1991.

Two children

were born of the marriage, Skye D. McPherson born October 12,
1992 (age 17 at trial), and Zackary W. McPherson born April 14,
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1994 (age 16).
3. Irreconcilable differences arose which made the
legitimate ends of a marriage impossible and each was awarded a
dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences on May 6, 2010. Other issues were reserved for this
trial.
4.

This case seems to have at its heart whether respondent

was terminated because of his job "voluntarily" such that the
court should impute income higher than he is now actually
earning.
5. At the time of the marriage respondent was a diesel
mechanic.

His social security earning record shows that since

the marriage his yearly medicare earnings were as follows:
1991

$17,834

1992

20,676

1993

2,485

1994

23,921

1995

43,058

1996

54,044

1997

53,802

1998

59,816

1999

58,378

2000

59,971

2001

57,702

-5-

2002

55,479

2003

59,656

2004

65,379

2005

58,544

2006

61,405

2007

170,809

2008

158,007

2009

189,044

6. As can be seen there was a dramatic increase in income in
2007.

At that time respondent became the Product Sales and

Support Representative (PSSR) at Wheeler Machinery which caused
his increase in salary.

He had been a diesel mechanic at Wheeler

for approximately 12 years before 2007.

The PSSR job was a

different job from being a mechanic. He was terminated from that
job and Wheeler on November 25, 2009.

The Termination Notice

indicates that the reason was "violating our corporate
expectations related to customer interaction. (Left a threatening
voicemail)."

The form was checked as an involuntary termination

by respondent's supervisor.
7. That termination is the key to the financial issues of
this case, and thus this case itself really, as petitioner claims
the court should thus impute income under UCA 78B-12-203(7) under
the higher level of his most recent earnings from 2007-2009.
Before the "promotion" in 2007, from the time of the marriage,
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respondents average yearly income from 1991 through 2006 was
$47,00 per year, or $3917 per month.
particularly "low" year in 1993.

This includes one

From 2007 through 2009, three

years, respondent earned an average of $172,620 per year, or
$14,385 per month, almost four times what he had earned
previously and what he is currently earning. Thus, the difference
in monthly gross income in the first 16 years of marriage and in
the last three years of the marriage is over $10,000 per month.
Hence, this trial over this issue-should the court find
respondent's income as he has earned during most of the marriage
and currently, or what he earned in a three year period when he
enjoyed a "promotion" and was doing a different job?
8. If the court is to impute income the court must find
respondent is underemployed.

He currently earns $27.00 per hour

as a diesel mechanic, which equates to $4680 gross income per
month.

Before the "promotion" in 2007 he was earning $23.00 per

hour as a diesel mechanic.

The court is to consider his

abilities, whether his current salary is below the current market
for such positions, current job openings, his work history,
occupational qualifications, prevailing earnings of those with
similar backgrounds and similar factors.

UCA 78B-12-203(7).

9. Here, obviously respondent has the "ability" to earn what
he earned from 2007-2009, approximately $14,000 per month.

That

is obviously so because in fact he earned that amount, without
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dispute.

He has a high school education, is age 44,

certified diesel engine mechanic.

and is a

He has worked on a farm, as a

framer, and these jobs as a diesel mechanic and PSSR. Thus, the
issue becomes whether the court should impute such a higher
figure because he was terminated from that job "voluntarily,"
that is, because of his own conduct.
10. Respondent was terminated after 15 years with the
company, Wheeler Machinery in Salt Lake City, because he left a
voice message on the telephone of a customer of Wheeler
Machinery.
11. Respondent was called a Product Sales and Service
Representative (PSSR).

In that capacity he had contact with

customers both during and after traditional work periods of the
day. Evidently he was involved in sales and a liaison between
service and the customer in some ways not understood by the
court.

He had a customer in another part of Utah and had contact

with a woman and a man in that other company.
respondent's cohabitant, and she is age 28.

That woman is now
That man, a co-

worker with the woman, became protective of the woman and had
sought to track or trace the movements of respondent relative to
respondent's contacts with that woman, evidently believing that
the woman and respondent were having some type of relationship of
which that man did not approve.

That suspicion was evidently

correct, as noted, in that respondent and that woman now live

-80000

together.

Based thereon, based on the conduct of the man which

conduct respondent did not like, respondent left a voice message
with that man which was threatening in tone.

That man reported

that voice message to his company, who reported it to
respondent's Human Resource department at Wheeler.

From there

respondent's supervisor was informed and called in respondent.
Respondent apologized and asked if he could remain with the
company, Wheeler, but the supervisor issued the termination
notice based on that conduct.

Respondent was terminated outright

from Wheeler for not abiding by company policy.
12. The position respondent had paid a fairly low base
salary (approximately $1000 per month) but most of the income was
from commission.

At the time (2007-2009) there were 3.5 such

positions at Wheeler, PSSRs, in the division in which respondent
worked.

He was at the top of the income chart as to those 3.5

PSSRs along with another in that division and in that position.
Before termination Wheeler personnel had already been discussed
with respondent and the other PSSRs that the commission structure
was going to be modified so that such PSSRs would normally be
expected to earn beginning in 2010 between $100,000-150,000,
rather than the higher figures respondent had been earning,
though there would not have been a "cap" on the upper earnings
amount.

The industry, especially that division ("power systems"

in the heavy equipment industry), is down approximately 20% due
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to its relationship to construction which is down under the
general economy.
13. The termination was in one sense "voluntary" in that
respondent was terminated because of his own actions rather than
a work force reduction, poor economy, closure of a business, or
other reasons not associated with his conduct.

The court does

not believe simply that misdeeds at work justify a finding that
the termination should result in an imputation of higher income.
The court must determine, and find from facts, whether respondent
decided to be terminated so he would not have to pay a higher
level of alimony and/or child support, that is, so he could
reduce his support payments or avoid those support obligations.
Respondent's position at trial is indeed that he ought not to
have to pay alimony and he has so asked and so informed
petitioner that he would not pay alimony to petitioner.

The

court considers the actions of respondent before and after his
firing, that he immediately sought another job in his more
"historic" field of being a diesel mechanic, that he is now
earning an hourly wage which is higher than the wage he earned as
a diesel mechanic before 2007 and in an amount that JS above the
average Utah diesel mechanic hourly wage, that he is working in
his more historic field, as well as all the factors surrounding
the termination.

He obtained a job

three weeks of termination.

on December 14, 2009, within

He continues to see if positions
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similar to the Wheeler PSSR position are available.

There was no

evidence presented by either party as to the availability of such
jobs with other companies, nor what they may pay, nor what
qualifications are necessary for such higher paying jobs.

It is

clear to this court, and the court finds, respondent cannot go
back to work for Wheeler.

No evidence showed what respondent

could earn elsewhere in similar jobs, or if there are similar
jobs.

Here, the statute at issue on imputation does not state

that the court may only find underemployment if the court finds
an intent to avoid or reduce support obligations.

However, the

purposes of the imputation statute seem to be the prevention of
situations where a person seeks to avoid support obligations by
simply reducing his income voluntarily.
14. The court heard the testimony of the individuals
involved in the termination, respondent and his then-supervisor
who fired him.

The court cannot find that respondent was

terminated so that he would not have to pay a higher support
amount.

With his past "high" salary and commissions in 2007-

2009, even paying the temporary order amount of almost $4400 per
month, respondent had more money to live on himself than he now
has even if he paid no support to petitioner or to the children.
While many people behave irrationally in divorces, and this court
has indeed on occasion seen people purposefully quit or "lose"
their job or income to avoid giving anything to the adverse
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spouse, the court finds that even though this termination was the
"fault" of respondent, and the timing is close to the temporary
order issued, and respondent does not feel alimony should be
paid, the court finds that the termination was NOT for the
purpose of lowering payments to his children or lowering alimony
payments to petitioner.

He acted voluntarily in getting

terminated, though it was not his intent to be fired nor halt
paying petitioner. Respondent considered the voice mail a
"personal" comment to the customer about respondent's
relationships, and not about work related matters.

Indeed, the

voice message was not directly about work, but was about personal
issues.

Wheeler did not see it the same way but believed that

because the man who was called was a Wheeler customer, respondent
was wrong and violated company policy.

He was thus terminated.

The court finds respondent would be better off financially with
the PSSR job, even with a reduced income which was anticipated to
begin in 2010, and paying greater support, than he is currently.
He still earns a good salary but compared to the three years
2007-2009 of course it is less than one third that salary.
15. The temporary order was entered in this case after a
hearing on October 30, 2009, ordering respondent to pay $2425 per
month as temporary alimony effective November 1, 2009, and
temporary child support in the sum of $1965 per month, obviously
based on respondent's earnings at that time.
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Thus, his total

obligation was $4390 per month.
2009.

He was terminated November 25,

In December he sought to eliminate alimony and reduce

child support. The court upheld the original order prior to trial
after several requests to do otherwise, objections by respondent,
and several hearings.
16. Petitioner has worked during the marriage except for the
time shortly after the birth of the two children.

She has worked

with Discover Card in collections and is now a team supervisor.
She currently earns $19.63 per hour, working between 32-25 hours
per week.

Even though she works a bit less than full time, she

could if she desired work 39 hours per week, though not 40
evidently under Discover rules.

Given the circumstances, the

court must also impute that wage to her at that weekly rate as to
the number of hours possible.

Thus, at 39 hours per week, and

$19.63 per month, r^Bp^uijjaut' s gross monthly income is $3317 per

Wit
month.
17. Child support should be calculated using the figures of
$4680 gross income per month for respondent and $3317 for
petitioner, using the sole custody work sheet. It is payable
under UCA 78B-12-112.
18. Petitioner claims monthly expenses of $6525 for herself
and the two children.

The court is assuming that petitioner has

sole custody of the two children, which custody is not now
contested.

The eldest child, who delivered a child (a grandchild
-13-

to these parties) the night before the scheduled trial date of
June 25, 2010, will be age 18 in October of 2010 and graduate
from high school in May or June 2011.

The evidence did not

reveal if that eldest child will be living with petitioner or on
her own long term but that 17 year old "child" and the new
grandchild since the birth on June 24, 2010, are living with
petitioner currently since the birth of the grandchild.

That

child will be a senior in high school in the Fall of 2010 and the
younger child will be a junior. Nevertheless, the court is forced
to reduce as unreasonable the areas of food and supplies (reduced
by $200), electricity (-50), natural gas (-50), cell phone (-50),
cable tv (-50), school and sports (-100), entertainment (-100),
gifts (-100), incidental (-50), and auto expense (-200).

Those

are reduced to what the court believes is reasonable given the
incomes of the parties, as the standard of living during most of
the marriage except the last three years of the marriage as
discussed above and as of trial. Thus, the court reduces the
claimed expenses by $950, finding the reasonable monthly expenses
to be $5575, subject to the discussion below concerning the
marital home.
19. The marital home has a value of $340,000 based on an
agreed appraisal occurring in November 2009. The mortgage balance
is $358,000. The parties paid almost $430,000 for the home and
have put in over $100,000 in basement and landscape improvements,
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but it remains worth currently $340,000 and is marital property.
The parties are obviously "upside down" and owe more than it is
worth.

The mortgage payments have not been made since December

2009.

Petitioner is trying to obtain a modified loan to remain

in the home.

Her monthly expenses currently include the current

mortgage payment of $2577, which is not being paid and has not
been paid by petitioner or respondent since December 2009.

Thus,

the court finds that it is most likely that the home will either
suffer a short sale or be foreclosed, but in any event that
mortgage payment will not continue to be made at the current
figure under any of the possible outcomes.

A lesser mortgage

must obviously be obtained on this or another residence or as a
rental payment.

The court finds that even with two children

under age 18 until April 2010, the mortgage payment cannot remain
at the level it was when there were two incomes and one was over
three times what it is now.

The court will reduce the claimed

expenses in the area of mortgage by $600, allowing a mortgage or
rental payment of $2000 per month.

In fact that is what

petitioner testified would be the approximate payment on the
mortgage IF the modification is approved, which at this point has
not happened. Thus, the reasonable total monthly expenses of
petitioner are $4975 after reducing the above areas and the
mortgage payment, which in any event is not in fact being paid by
anyone.
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20. Respondent claims his reasonable monthly expenses are
$4005.

He does not have physical custody of the children.

He is

living with his new girlfriend in Vernal, Utah. The court reduces
his claimed expenses in the area of food (-$200), cable tv(-50),
cell phone (-50), entertainment (-50), incidentals (-100), and
auto expense (-400) . Thus, the court reduces his expenses as
being unreasonable under the circumstances and finds the
reasonable monthly expenses of respondent to be $3155.
21. As to alimony the court has considered the statutory and
other factors concerning alimony, including the standard of
living during the marriage both during the "'normal" years when
respondent was a diesel mechanic and the "higher earning" years
when he was a PSSR, what each party gave up for the marriage,
what each brought into the marriage, the ages of the parties,
their health, their ability and training and education, the
duration of the marriage, the present income, how it was
acquired, the children, the ages and obligations of the parties,
the sacrifices, the standard of living, and fault. Principally
the court considers the need of petitioner based largely on their
standard of living at the time of trial and during 16 of the 19
years of the marriage, her own ability to meet those needs, and
the ability of respondent to make up that difference. The court
is to attempt to provide the standard of living, as nearly as
possible, as the parties enjoyed during the marriage and prevent
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a party from becoming a public charge. "Fault" is of course
difficult but in any event under Mark v. Mark,
App.

2009)

223 P. 3d 476 (T

fault is not considered much of a factor at this point

or in this case. The statute allows the court to normally
consider the standard of living at the time of separation, but
the court may, if it finds otherwise, use a standard from another
time.

The court has done that here given the unusual earning

history of respondent with 16 of 19 years being the more "true"
standard of living.
22. Thus, petitioner's needs are greater than respondent can
help meet given the court's findings.

This was a 19+ year

marriage.

Alimony is to continue terminable on the usual

triggers.

The court believes it is reasonable and fair that

respondent pay to petitioner the sum of $900 per month alimony.
Alimony is to be paid directly to petitioner half by the 5th and
20th of each month beginning July 2010.

This level of alimony

does not meet the needs of petitioner but respondent is unable to
pay more than that.

This allows the parties to live

approximately how they lived most of the marriage, but not during
the atypical last three years of marriage. Given that the
increased income was of a three year duration, the court finds it
appropriate to consider the standard of living at the time of
trial and for 16 of the 19 years of the marriage rather than the
three year period of increased income at the time of separation,
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23. The parties are to share equally in the educational and
therapy and medical needs of the children under statute.
24. Petitioner neither contributed to respondent's ability
to earn nor help in schooling or training.
25. Respondent sought, after termination from his job, to
retroactively reduce the support obligation and he asks the court
to do so now.

The evidence before the court at the time of the

commissioner's hearings justified the higher amount as the
"termination" indeed appeared to be "self-inflicted" and
purposeful.

The court sees no basis in law, fact, or equity to

retroactively reduce the amounts.

Judgments were made on the

available evidence and now that trial has occurred and fuller
facts shown, as well as credibility determinations made, and the
court finds and concludes no adjustment is needed retroactively.
Respondent has made payments, and has failed to make payments.
He is now in arrearages, through June 2010, since November 2009,
in the sum of $9641 including child support and alimony.
26. However, respondent in January 2010 was allowed to
withdraw up to half his 401(k) to make those support payments.
In fact that was done at the behest of petitioner.

The

withdrawal of those amounts have been subject to a tax
consequence.

At the time in January 2010 respondent had $49,903

in his Wheeler retirement account and petitioner had $16,451 in
her Discover 401)(k) account.

Because the court has found
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respondent did not "self-terminate" to avoid paying support, but
has refused to retroactively reduce the support payment amounts,
the court will require petitioner to participate equally in any
tax liability from those withdrawals from the retirement fund.
Even though respondent has been delinquent in paying the full
amounts of support, the court believes this result is equitable.
After the amounts withdrawn, which was approximately $25,000, the
taxes were taken out and the actual amount received was $16,217.
The remainder in respondent's retirement account and petitioner's
account should be divided equally under a QDRO (roughly $25,000 +
$16,000=$41,000 to be divided equally). The withdrawals did not
in fact result in full payment being made by respondent, as he
still is $9,641 behind as found.

However, the withdrawal also

did not result in the mortgage payments being made as the last
full payment by respondent was made in December, the same month
the mortgage payment was last made. The court does not find or
attribute fault to either party for that fact.

The simple fact

is that on incomes as currently exists, not considering the 20072009 incomes, a house payment of almost $2600 is almost
impossible to maintain and the home was in trouble even if full
payment had been made.
27. In 2009 petitioner filed tax returns under the married
but separately status, and took the children and mortgage
interest as deductions, resulting in a refund from federal taxes
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of $2998 and a state refund of $1136, or a total refund of $4134,
half of which is $2067. The parties failed to communicate
properly and this result followed.
28. The parties are to share in any tax refund or liability
but the better solution is for the parties to file an amended
return and file married and jointly for 2009. The parties are to
share equally and evenly in any tax owing or tax refund for 2009.
The court is not certain it can order such an amendment but if it
can it does. If it cannot, there is to be an equal sharing of tax
liability or refund, but no doubt a liability for 2009 will occur
for respondent with a high income and basically no deductions.
In 2010 the parties may filed separate returns, petitioner taking
the oldest child as a deduction and respondent the younger child.
They are to alternate years thereafter.
29.

As found, the home is "upside down'' and must either be

refinanced, sold short or foreclosed, with no payments having
been made since December 2009.

Given the amounts found herein,

it is the court's belief that a loan modification will not likely
occur, given petitioner's income, the lower amount of alimony
awarded and child support and an amount due of approximately
$360,000 plus amounts in arrears of over $16,000 not paid since
December 2009, which amount must be added to that $360,000.

If

petitioner can refinance, the home is awarded to petitioner with
all its debt holding respondent harmless.

If she cannot, any
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loss from a short sale or foreclosure is to be shared equally and
any income tax consequence and liability are to be borne equally
as well.
30. During the marriage before job termination, respondent
withheld $14,000 in cash from his direct deposit pay.
Petitioner, upon realizing that, also took funds from the marital
accounts.

The court finds all accounts, even though in perhaps

one name, were marital property as having been composed of
earnings which were co-mingled. Petitioner became nervous and
withdrew funds, but returned all but $2000 of those marital
funds.

Her candor about some of those transfers is not high in

the court's opinion, but the court finds that the sum of $14,000
of marital property was withheld by respondent and $2000 was
withheld by petitioner.

Thus, each is entitled to $6000.

Respondent claimed that petitioner actually took $9000 of that
$14,000 from his truck but the court finds otherwise, that such
an event did not happen.

The court simply cannot credit the

testimony of respondent that he drove around in a business truck
with $14,000 in cash in the visor of that truck for some months.
Further, a transcript of a recorded telephone call in October
2009 was received in which respondent admitted he had lost the
money gambling.
31. The parties met for a period after separation and "got
along'' and divided the personal property.

They seem now to have
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moved away from the "getting along'' period and now disagree-petitioner claims she is entitled to the timeshare because
respondent took his tools of the trade, a tool box full of tools.
At the time he was not utilizing those tools as he was working as
a PSSR and not a mechanic.

Based on that the court finds there

was an agreement that respondent take his tools and petitioner
would be entitled to maintain the time share with "RDI."

That

timeshare cost approximately $6500 and has a yearly fees
associated.

The tools are worth $8-10,000.

The court awards

petitioner the timeshare and its indebtedness and respondent is
not entitled to its use, and if sold, to any proceeds, nor is he
required to pay any fees. The tools belong to respondent.
32. The parties also disagree on three firearms that were in
the home.

Respondent claims he did not take them and does not

have them and petitioner claims the three guns are not in the
home and respondent took them.

The court has a hard time

determining credibility on this issue and will not make a finding
based on general credibility findings.

IF the firearms are in

the marital home, they should be returned to respondent.

A

neutral person agreeable to each party shall, with petitioner, go
through the marital home within 5 days of this decision to look
for such and if they are located they are to be returned to
respondent, assuming he is not in any way restricted from their
possession.

If such firearms are not located, no further
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findings are issued on the firearms.
34. Each party is entitled to maintain the current vehicle
in their possession.

Petitioner has a 2007 Mazda and respondent

a 2006 Chevrolet truck.

Each is to maintain that vehicle, each

having an approximately equal value, together with the
indebtedness thereon.
35. Petitioner has a life insurance policy with a cash value
of $3564 and respondent has a similar life insurance policy with
a cash value of $3733.

Each is to maintain the policy each owns.

36. In this action to establish alimony and child support,
the court finds and concludes under UCA 30-3-5 that neither is
able to assist the other in payment of attorney fees.

Each is

responsible for their own costs and attorney fees.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The parties are within the jurisdiction of the court.
2. Respondent is to pay child support under the tables with
the above incomes being utilized.
3. Respondent is to pay $900 per month alimony terminable on
the usual triggers.
4. There should be no retroactive adjustment to the support
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ordered October 30, 2009.
5. The tax liabilities should be disposed of as found above.
6. The home should be awarded to petitioner if she can
obtain a loan modification and respondent held harmless, but it
is likely that the home will be sold or foreclosed, and the
parties shall share equally in any loss and tax consequences.
7. The personal property shall be divided as found above.
8. The retirement funds shall be divided as found and
discussed and the tax liabilities imposed.
9. The amounts underpaid and withheld shall be offset as
discussed above and judgment entered for those amounts.
10. Each party shall bear their own fees.

Respondent is to prepare a supplemental decree in
compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS
MEMORANDUM DECISION IS HEREBY INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE AND IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE COURT'S ORDER.

DATED this /

day of

1-

BRUCE: C. LDBECK '.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM EX. 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
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CINDI MCPHERSON,
RULING and ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 094401941
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
GORDON w. MCPHERSON,
Respondent.
DATE: August 4, 2010

The above matter came before the court for decision on
Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings.
Respondent filed the motion July 8, 2010, after a trial was
held June 25 and 30, 2010, and after the court issued its
memorandum decision July 1, 2010. Petitioner filed a response on
July 12, 2010. Respondent filed a reply on July 15, 2010, and a
request to submit the same date.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the
entire file, and concludes as follows. The court does not believe
oral argument would be of benefit to the court.

The court tried

the case, maintained its notes and exhibits, and is fully
advised.

DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims the court needs to modify its findings as
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to alimony and as to money allegedly taken by petitioner.
The court agrees that it should re-examine some its
findings.

The court failed to properly calculate the amount of

child support in its own mind.

The court found the gross income

as in the memorandum decision paragraphs 8, 16 and 17, though the
court erroneously in paragraph 16 attributed to respondent rather
than petitioner the income of $3317 per month. However, the court
in its own mind mis-calculated the child support on those figures
and thus did not properly calculate the alimony amount.
Based on the motion, the court has now re-examined all of
its findings as to income and reasonable needs.

This was a long

term marriage and petitioner has custody of the two children.
However, respondent is certainly correct.

The court did not

specifically find that respondent could pay $900 per month given
his expenses though that was clearly inherent m
findings and discussion.
court's own error m

the court's

Again, however, that was based on the

determining for its own purposes the amount

of child support.
The court therefore modifies the memorandum decision
findings as follows:
In paragraph 20, the court now determines that respondent's
reasonable expenses are $2855 rather than $3155.
reduces, m

The court

addition to those reductions in the memorandum

decision, the areas of clothing (-50), entertainment (additional
-50), and auto expense (additional -100).

Thus, the court finds
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respondent's reasonable expenses are $2955.
In paragraph 22 the court finds that given petitioner's
expenses and respondent's expenses and their incomes, and the
needs of petitioner and respondent's ability to pay, respondent
is able to pay the sum of $800 per month alimony.

Given his

income of $4680, minus the child support of $851 is $3829, minus
his reasonable living expenses now found at $2955, he is able to
pay $800 per month as alimony as he has over $800 remaining with
which to pay petitioner alimony.
Again, all this is tempered by the equitable consideration
that while the court has found respondent is now earning this
sum, his past indicates he is clearly able to earn more and that
eventuality is not foreclosed by his present employment.
The court is unwilling to make any changes in the claim of a
withdrawal of $9500 by petitioner. The court did consider the
testimony in paragraph 30 and it remains.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required other than the preparation of the decree as
previously ordered, incorporating these changes and
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modifications.

DATED th is JJ_

day of

MJ//

, 2010,

BRUCE C\ LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGED
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